Aggregation with a Non-Convex Labour Supply Decision, Unobservable Effort, and Reciprocity (“Gift Exchange”) in Labor Relations by Vasilev, Aleksandar
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Field 
 
 
  
 
heoretical and Practical Research 
in Economic Fields 
Biannually 
Volume IX 
Issue 1(17) 
Summer 2018 
 
ISSN 2068 – 7710 
Journal DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.14505/tpref 
 
A
S
E
R
S
 
T 
Volume IX, Issue 1(17), Summer 2018  
9 
 
 
 
is an advanced e-publisher struggling to bring further worldwide learning, 
knowledge and research. This transformative mission is realized through our 
commitment to innovation and enterprise, placing us at the cutting-edge of 
electronic delivery in a world that increasingly considers the dominance of digital 
content and networked access not only to books and journals but to a whole range of other pedagogic 
services. 
 In both books and journals, ASERS Publishing is a hallmark of the finest scholarly publishing and 
cutting-edge research, maintained by our commitment to rigorous peer-review process. 
 Using pioneer developing technologies, ASERS Publishing keeps pace with the rapid changes in 
the e-publishing market. 
 ASERS Publishing is committed to providing customers with the information they want, when they 
want and how they want it. To serve this purpose, ASERS publishing offers digital Higher Education 
materials from its journals, courses and scientific books, in a proven way in order to engage the academic 
society from the entire world. 
  
 
 
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields 
 
 
91 
 
 
 Contents: 
 
 
1 
Tourism Demand and Exogenous Exchange Rate in 
Cambodia: A Stochastic Seasonal ARIMAX Approach 
Theara CHHORN  
…5 
2 
Wage Inequality and Innovative Intelligence-Biased 
Technological Change 
Taiji HARASHIMA 
…17 
3 
Technical Trading Rules and Trading Signals in the Black 
Market for Foreign Exchange in Sudan 
Ibrahim A. ONOUR 
…25 
4 
Assessing the Impact of Integration on Economic Growth 
and Food Security in ECOWAS 
Almame Abdoulganiour TINTA, Daniel Bruce SARPONG, Idrissa Mohamed 
OUEDRAOGO, Ramatu Al HASSAN, Akwasi Mensah-BONSU, Edward 
Ebo ONUMAH 
…32 
5 
Aggregation with a Non-Convex Labour Supply Decision, 
Unobservable Effort, and Reciprocity (“Gift Exchange”) in 
Labor Relations 
Aleksandar VASILEV  
…45 
6 
The Credit Channel Transmission of Monetary Policy in 
Tunisia 
Ali MNA, Moheddine YOUNSI 
…49 
7 
Forecasting Inflation in Sierra Leone Using ARIMA and 
ARIMAX: A Comparative Evaluation. Model Building and 
Analysis Team 
Edmund TAMUKE, Emerson Abraham JACKSON, Abdulai SILLAH  
…63 
8 
Monetary Policy of Georgia in XI-XII Centuries and Its 
Influence on the International Financial and Economic 
Relations 
George ABUSELIDZE  
…75 
9 
Creative Economy Development Based on Triple Helix in 
Indonesia 
Rudy BADRUDIN, Baldric SIREGAR 
…82 
10 
Investment Attraction, Competition and Growth; Theoretical 
Perspective in the Context of Africa 
Emmanuel Tweneboah SENZU 
…92 
11 
Evolution of International Trade in Romania between 2016 - 
2018 with Forecasts for 2019-2021 
Octavian Dan RĂDESCU  
…103 
12 
The Link Between Migration, Remittances and Economic 
Growth: Empirical Evidence from Romania 
Ramona PIRVU, Roxana BADARCEA, Alina MANTA, Nicoleta FLOREA 
…109 
 
Winter 2016 
 
Volume IX 
Issue 1(17) 
Summer 2018 
 
Editor in Chief 
 
PhD Laura UNGUREANU 
Spiru Haret University, Romania 
 
Editor 
 
PhD Ivan KITOV 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia 
 
Editorial Advisory Board  
 
Monal Abdel-Baki 
American University in Cairo, Egypt 
 
Mădălina Constantinescu 
SpiruHaret University, Romania 
 
Jean-Paul Gaertner 
Ecole de Management de Strasbourg, 
France 
 
Piotr Misztal 
The Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, 
Faculty of Management and Administration, 
Poland 
 
Russell Pittman 
International Technical Assistance 
Economic Analysis Group Antitrust Division, 
USA 
 
Rachel Price-Kreitz 
Ecole de Management de Strasbourg, 
France 
 
Rena Ravinder 
Politechnic of Namibia, Namibia 
 
Andy Ștefănescu 
University of Craiova, Romania 
 
Laura Gavrilă (formerly Ștefănescu) 
Spiru Haret University, Romania 
 
Hans-Jürgen Weißbach 
University of Applied Sciences - Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany 
 
Aleksandar Vasilev 
American University in Bulgaria, Bulgaria 
 
 
 
ASERS Publishing 
http://www.asers.eu/asers-publishing 
ISSN 2068 – 7710 
Journal's Issue DOI:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.14505/tpref.v9.1(17).00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Field 
 
 
 
 
 
Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth 
of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this 
tendency, Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields has been conceived and designed 
outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. It consists of concise communications that provide 
a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic 
research.  
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields publishes original articles in all 
branches of economics – theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage 
across the subject area. 
Journal promotes research that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the 
empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and 
rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics from the frontier of theoretical developments in 
many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to 
methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in economics. The interaction between 
empirical work and economic policy is an important feature of the journal. 
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, starting with its first issue, it is indexed 
in EconLit, RePEC, EBSCO, ProQuest, Cabell Directories and CEEOL databases. 
The primary aim of the Journal has been and remains the provision of a forum for the dissemination 
of a variety of international issues, empirical research and other matters of interest to researchers and 
practitioners in a diversity of subject areas linked to the broad theme of economic sciences. 
All the papers will be first considered by the Editors for general relevance, originality and 
significance. If accepted for review, papers will then be subject to double blind peer review.  
Invited manuscripts will be due till May 10th, 2018, and shall go through the usual, albeit somewhat 
expedited, refereeing process.  
 
Deadline for submission of proposals:   10th November 2018 
 
Expected publication date:  December 2018 
 
Website:     http://journals.aserspublishing.eu/tpref 
 
E-mail:     tpref@aserspublishing.eu, asers.tpref@gmail.com 
 
To prepare your paper for submission, please see full author guidelines in the following file: 
TPREF_Full_Paper_Template.docx, on our site. 
 
 
Call for Papers 
Volume IX, Issue 2(18), Winter 2018 
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
AGGREGATION WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOUR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE 
EFFORT, AND RECIPROCITY (“GIFT EXCHANGE”) IN LABOR RELATIONS 
 
Aleksandar VASILEV  
Independent Researcher, Bulgaria,  
alvasilev@yahoo.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labour supply decision in an economy with 
reciprocity in labour relations ("gift exchange") a la Danthine and Kurmann (2010), and explicitly perform the 
aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations 
- the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in 
Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a 
discrete labour supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labour supply increases from unity to infinity. 
Keywords: aggregation; indivisible labour; non-convexities; reciprocity. 
JEL Classification: E10; J22; J41; J46. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with 
reciprocity in labour relations ("gift exchange") a la Danthine and Kurmann (2010), and explicitly perform the 
aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations 
- the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in 
Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a 
discrete labour supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labour supply increases from unity to infinity. 
1. Model Setup 
The theoretical setup follows to a great extent Vasilev (2017). To simplify the analysis, the model economy 
here is static, without physical capital, and agents will face a non-convex labour supply decision. Effort exerted by 
workers is a productive input in the final-goods sector, but unobservable, and thus not directly contractible. 
However, producers understand that while workers do not like exerting effort, they derive utility from returning the 
gift of a generous wage by supplying a higher effort level even in an environment of costly monitoring. This leads 
to the firm paying an efficiency wage. Since the focus is on a one-period world, the model abstracts away from 
technological progress, population growth and uncertainty. There is a large number of identical one-member 
households, indexed by i and distributed uniformly on the unit interval. In the exposition below, we will use small 
case letters to denote individual variables and suppress the index i to save on notation. 
 
1.1 Households 
Each household maximizes the following utility function: 
U(c,e,n) = ln c +ln(1-h)-h[ 0.5 e2-R(e,.)]        (1) 
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where c denotes consumption of each household i, h is the fraction of time available to household i that is 
spent working, and e is the level of effort exerted. The total time endowment available to each household i is 
normalized to unity, thus leisure, hl 1 , is implicitly expressed as time off work. The novelty here is the ,.)(eR
utility term, which is included to capture that workers may derive utility out of "reciprocal behavior towards their 
employer." As long as 0,.)( eRe , household i would be willing to reward a wage that is perceived to be above 
the competitive one (even in the absence of any direct material gain resulting from such an action) with a level of 
effort above the required minimum (say, zero). 
As in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) household’s labour supply is assumed to be indivisible, i.e. 
},0{ hh . The problem faced by a household that decides to work full-time is then to set hh  and enjoy 
,.)]()(5.0[)1ln(ln 2 wwww eRehhcU  ,      (2) 
where  hwcw  and we are the consumption and effort levels when working. Note that the effort level 
will be determined implicitly from its optimality condition ,.)(eRe e , which does not depend on the other model 
variables. In contrast, a household that decides not to work chooses 0h  and enjoy 
uu cU ln ,            (3) 
where uc  is the consumption level when the household is not working. 
1.2. Reciprocity  
As in Vasilev (2017), the reciprocity tem, ,.)(eR , in the household's utility function is modeled as a product 
of the mutual "gifts" of an employed household and the representative firm: 
)()(,.)( wgedeR            (4) 
where )(ed denote the gift of the employed household towards the firm, expressed in terms of effort 
exerted, and )(wg is the counter-gift of the firm to the worker in terms of the wage rate paid. Both terms are 
assumed to be concave in their respective arguments, i.e. 0)( ede , 0)( edee , and 0)( wgw , 
0)( wgww . Hence, when a worker receives a wage offer that is perceived as generous (e.g. a wage above the 
competitive rate), i.e., 0)( wg , the household's utility increases if there is a reciprocal gift expressed in terms 
of higher effort, 0)( ed . In addition, from the perspective of an atomistic worker, the wage rate is taken as given, 
that is why 0)( edw . In addition, employed households do not take into consideration the effect of their 
(individual) effort on the firm's output, and hence on the gift made by the firm to the worker, i.e., 0)( wge  from 
the perspective of an employed household. Note that in defining the two gifts, both are expressed as deviations 
from some expected norm ("reference level"). To simplify the analysis, we will normalize the minimum acceptable 
effort level to be 0min e . The worker's gift then can be expressed as: 
)()( efed             (5) 
where the functional form was intentionally chosen the same as the firm's production function. Next, we 
define the firm's gift as follows: 
neHfwwg ln)(lnln)(   , 
where the first term on the right-hand-side, wln , is the utility benefit resulting from a higher consumption, 
which the worker attributes to the firm's wage offered. The remaining term has to do with rent-sharing considerations 
between the firm and the worker, as it represents the surplus to be shared (worker's product). In this case it 
represents a case where the firm distributes all the revenue to its workers. Plugging this expression into the optimal 
effort condition 
)()(')()(,.)( wgefwgedeRe ee  ,        (6) 
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which does not have a closed-form solution. However, if we use 
eef )( , 10  , then we can express 
the wage rate as 
n
eHe
w



)(
lnln
2


. 
From this equation it follows that the wage rate set by the firm positively depends on the firm's revenue per 
worker ( 0 ), as it increases the total surplus/rent of the labor relationship; this is also referred to as a rent-
sharing motive. 
1.3. Stand-in Firm 
There is a representative firm in the model economy. It produces a homogeneous final product using a 
production function that requires labor H as the only input. For simplicity, output price will be normalized to unity. 
The production function f(H) features decreasing returns to scale (for any effort level): 0)(' eHf , 
0)(" eHf , )0('f , 0)( henf . The representative firm acts competitively by setting the wage rate w 
and choosing H to maximize profit by stimulating optimal effort: 
wHeHf  )( s.t hH 0          (7) 
and 
)()(' wgefe             (8) 
In equilibrium, there will be positive profit, which follows from the assumptions imposed on the production 
function. 
1.4. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE): Definition 
A DCE is defined by allocations {cw; cu; e; H}, wage rate {w}, and aggregate profit (  ) s.t.  
(1) all households maximize utility;  
(2) the stand-in firm maximizes profit;  
(3) all markets clear. 
2. Characterization of the DCE and derivation of the aggregate utility function 
It will be shown that in the DCE, if it exists, only some of the households will be employed and work full-
time, while the rest will be unemployed. Following the arguments in Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), it can be 
easily shown that polar cases in which each household either, or a case in which nobody works, cannot not be 
equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, it must be the case that an only proportion of the agents in the economy are 
working. Denote this mass of employed by n. Workers will receive consumption cw, while those not selected for 
work will consume cu. Note that n can be interpreted also as the probability of being chosen to work: This probability 
is determined endogenously in the model, as workers would seek for the optimal balance between the net return 
from working in terms of increased utility of consumption, which, however, comes at the expense of lower utility out 
of leisure. Note that no matter of the employment outcome, ex post every household enjoys the same utility level. 
Thus, in equilibrium hnH  . As derived earlier, the wage is set equal to: 
n
nhee
w



)ln(
ln
2


. 
Firm’s profit is then 
hwnhnef  )(  ,         (9) 
which follows from the decreasing returns to scale featured by the production function. Next, to show that the DCE 
actually exists, it is sufficient to show the existence of a fixed-point n in the unit interval by analyzing a non-linear 
equation using the fact that in equilibrium utility is the same for all households. It is trivial to show that everyone 
working in the market sector (n = 1) is not an equilibrium, since then w = 0. From the ex-ante symmetry assumption 
for households, market consumption would be the same for workers and those not selected for work, while the 
latter would enjoy higher utility out of leisure, hence there is no benefit of working. Similarly, nobody working (n = 
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0) is not an equilibrium outcome either, since the firm would then offer a very high wage for the first unit of labour, 
and by taking a full-time job a marginal worker could increase his/her utility a lot. 
Thus, if there is a DCE, then it must be that not all households would receive the same consumption bundle. 
If n in the unit interval is an equilibrium employment rate, then total utility for households that work should equal to 
the utility of households that do not supply any hours. This equation is monotone in n, as the utility function is a 
sum of monotone functions. Thus, we can explore the behaviour of that function (the difference between the utility 
of working and not working) as we let n vary in the (0, 1) interval. As n approaches 0, the left-hand-side dominates 
(utility of working is higher), while when n approaches unity, the right-hand-side dominates (utility of not working is 
higher), where the results follow from the concavity of the utility functions and the production technology. In addition, 
from the continuity of those functions, there is an n in the unit interval, which is consistent with equilibrium. The 
unique value of equilibrium n follows from the monotonicity of the utility and production functions. Let cw and cu 
denote equilibrium consumption allocations of individuals selected for work, and those who will work in the informal 
sector. 
Given the indivisibility of the labour supply, the equilibrium allocation obtained above is not Pareto optimal, 
as demonstrated in Rogerson (1988). More specifically, a social planner (SP) could make everyone better off by 
using an employment lottery in the first stage and choosing the fraction n of individual households to work in the 
market sector and give everyone consumption ncw + (1-n)cu. In order to show this, we need to check that such an 
allocation is feasible, and that it provides a higher level of total utility. Showing feasibility is trivial as total market 
labour input and total consumption are identical to the corresponding individual equilibrium values. 
Next, we will show that the new allocation, which is independent of household’s employment status in the 
market sector, makes households better o since it generates higher utility on average. This is indeed the case, 
where the strict inequality follows from the convexity of the CES aggregation and the concavity of the logarithmic 
function. Thus, the SP is indeed giving in expected utility terms an allocation that is an improvement over the initial 
equilibrium allocation. If households can pool income together and doing so, they will be able to equalize 
consumption across states, i.e., c = cw = cu, so aggregate utility becomes: 
U(c,e,n)=ln c +n [ln(1-h )- 0.5 e2+R(e,.)], 
which is the representation in Vasilev (2017). On the aggregate, when each household faces an indivisible labour 
choices, the representative agent obtained from the aggregation features different preferences of work: as in 
Hansen (1985), the disutility of work in the market sector is now linear. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labour supply decision in an economy with 
reciprocity in labour relations ("gift exchange") a la Danthine and Kurmann (2010), and explicitly perform the 
aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations 
- the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in 
Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a 
discrete labour supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labour supply increases from unity to infinity. 
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